After the Norman Conquest in 1066, our common law was developed on the basis of precedents established in the king`s courts (the courts of justice) established by William the Conqueror. However, access to justice remained limited. An aspiring litigant had few options, as only a few narrowly defined claims could be made. For example, for centuries there was no tort prosecution. Even for the successful litigant, appeals were essentially limited to financial benefits and judgments were difficult to enforce. With decisions based on past precedents, the system was relatively rigid and rigid. The interest of this person was not recognized by law, but recognized in equity and therefore acquired a reasonable interest. He was entitled to apply to the Court of Chancery for protection of his interests and rights against the Feoffee and the world, with the exception of the bona fide assignee of the legal succession for valuable consideration without notice. This part of English and Welsh law was formulated, developed and administered by the former common law courts.

The rules originally applied by these courts were based on the common customs of that country. One of the most important contributions of equity was in the area of «use» (the predecessor of the «trust»). «Use» was a means of transferring ownership to another (e.g. to retain «use» or to one or more others (e.g. C or D and E). In the United States today, federal courts and most state courts have merged law and equity into courts of general jurisdiction, such as county courts. However, the fundamental distinction between law and equity has retained its former vitality. [37] This difference is not a mere formality, since the successful processing of some cases is difficult, if not impossible, unless an injunction or injunction is issued at the outset to prevent a person from escaping his or her jurisdiction, for example by taking the only available property to comply with a judgment. In addition, some laws, such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, expressly allow only equitable remedies, requiring U.S.

courts to analyze in detail whether the relief required in certain cases filed under these laws would have been available on an equitable basis. [38] To avoid paying property taxes and other feudal rights, lawyers developed a primitive form of trust called «use,» which allowed one person (who did not have to pay taxes) to possess legal title to the land for use by another person. The effect of this trust was that the first person owned the land under the common law, but the second person had the right to use the land in accordance with the law of equity. After U.S. courts merged law and justice, U.S. courts took over many proceedings from the courts of equity. Fair court proceedings were much more flexible than common law courts. In American practice, certain means such as joinder, counterclaim, counterclaim and interpleading have their origins in equitable courts. For a brief overview of the maxims, doctrines, and remedies developed under justice, it would be easy to assume that the importance of justice as an evolving legal work ceased after 1875, after these foundations were laid. However, this is clearly not the case when one examines the many twentieth-century developments in justice. Rights and remedies created before 1873 still apply today.

In addition, they have been refined by modern judges and legal developments. The now established principle of «order estoppel in the Treaty» owes its existence to the judgment of Lord Denning in the High Trees case.10 Contractual licensing, constructive trust, and the doctrine of partial performance are at the discretion of the judge in equity. The rights of the abandoned spouse, an essential element of modern matrimonial property regimes, are equity gains reinforced by law. Therefore, justice as a source of law remains as topical and important a part of the English legal system as ever, although the conscientious lords chancellors who conceived the idea may question its role today. ■ To honour nineteenth-century reforms responsible for the administration of law and justice The Trust Act, 1882 — This Act is primarily concerned with the creation of equity. The rules contained in this Act are essentially the same as those applied at the time by the English courts of equity under the names of justice, equity and good conscience. The non-recognition of the right of land use by A and his heirs would risk paralysing the practice of land use if there had been no other means of protecting the use of the land. From about 1400 the Lord Chancellor intervened and intervened for the use of the cestui que. It did not encroach on the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, since the title was transferred to the feoffees and that title was recognised and enforced by the ordinary courts. The Chancellor saw his role as ensuring that Feoffee acted honestly and morally.

In accordance with the principle that equity works in personam (against the author personally), the Registrar took action against feoffees which infringed the moral rights of the latter. The final penalty for disobeying the clerk`s order was imprisonment or forfeiture of the accused`s property until the order was obeyed. In other words, the injustice committed by a fraudulent feoffee was a breach of contract or agreement, but it was a breach for which there was no recourse to the common law courts at the time. The enforceability of contracts has not yet been developed and, in any event, the rules governing contractual obligations preclude recourse against the use of such contracts. Contract Law, 1872 – Some doctrines of equity have been incorporated into the law, and some of the important doctrines that generally relate to contract law are the doctrine of penalties and forfeiture, the fixing of time in a contract, equitable redress for misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence. Sections 64 and 65 of this Act are nothing more than the codified form of the maxim: he who seeks justice must render justice. The corresponding court decree was issued in the name of the Federal Chancellor and had an effect «in personam» on the defendant. In this context, the term «in personam» refers to the fair process of enforcement of the decisions of the Registrar and the Court of Equity.

The Federal Chancellor`s orders were addressed personally to the defendant to comply. The punishment for disobeying the Chancellor`s decrees was imprisonment for contempt of court. Another difference is the unavailability of a jury in court: the judge is the trier of fact. In the U.S. legal system, the right to a jury trial in civil cases heard in federal court is guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment in common law trials, cases that would have traditionally been dealt with by the courts. Whether a case should be decided by a jury depends largely on the type of relief sought by the plaintiff. If a plaintiff seeks damages in the form of money or certain other forms of reparation, such as restitution of a particular property, the remedy is considered legal and a jury is available to establish the facts. On the other hand, if the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, special performance, contract modification, or other non-monetary relief, the claim would generally be a claim for equity. The system of fairness includes that part of natural justice that is enforceable in the courts but has not been enforced by the common law courts for various reasons. In this context, the term «natural justice» is used broadly to recognize and enforce the justiciable rights of aggrieved parties on the basis of principles of fairness and conscience not recognized by common law courts. The common law system was perceived as too formalistic and rigid, so that the potential rights of some litigants were abused. Principles that give effect to the rights of litigants and that are not recognized by the common law courts are called equity.

Eventually, the Judicature Act 1873-75 eventually merged the two legal systems, common law and equity, and provided that both were available in all courts.